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Abstract 
This paper1 provides an assessment of economic growth, employment and 
poverty reduction in the Arab MENA region. Considering the high rate of 
unemployment (especially the youth unemployment) and poverty in most 
countries in the region employment and poverty impacts of growth are of 
particular concern to policy makers. In the short run for employment growth 
to be faster than output growth the employment elasticity of growth has to be 
greater than unity. This is an important condition that is rarely satisfied across 
all sectors and countries in the region, for good analytical and empirical 
reasons. For example growth in high productivity sectors will not boost total 
employment nor reduce poverty substantially in the short run, yet growth in 
high productivity sectors is essential for accumulation and long term growth. 
Moreover, if the poor were to benefit from an employment policy they should 
have been integrated in the sectors where jobs are created – the so called 
integrability condition of the ‘employment-poverty nexus. Public work projects 
have been one of the main short term instruments of job creation for the poor 
in the region, but there the long term impact on poverty has varied and 
depended crucially on their sustainability, their contribution to improving local 
infrastructure and economies. These mixed results in no way invalidate the 
importance of economic growth for unemployment and poverty reduction, but 
brings into focus the importance of going beyond short term policies for job 
creation and poverty reduction as well as complementing such policies with 
social policies both for poverty alleviation and improving skill levels of the 
work force. 
                                                 
1 I (messkoub@iss.nl) would like to thank Dr Rizwanul Islam (of ILO) for his support 
and comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I benefited from the comments of and 
discussions with participants at the ILO-UNDP organised conference in Cairo (21-23 
November 2006) ‘Economic Growth, Employment and Poverty Reduction: Linkages 
and Policies’ where an earlier draft of this paper was presented. I would also like to 
thank Ms V. Bayangos for her excellent job of assisting me to get the data together for 
the paper. Finally, thanks are also due to the anonymous referee(s) of the ISS Working 
Papers Series for their insightful and helpful comments. I am solely responsible for 
any remaining errors. 
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Economic Growth, Employment and Poverty in the 
Middle East and North Africa 
1 Introduction 
This paper is concerned with the role of economic growth and its employment 
outcomes in providing solutions to the problems of poverty and 
unemployment in the Arab regions of Middle East and North Africa. It starts 
with an overview of macroeconomic condition, poverty and vulnerability in the 
MENA region. It then goes into a brief discussion of the labour market 
situation in the region looking at factors affecting labour supply and demand 
and the problem of unemployment, and youth unemployment in particular, in 
the MENA region. It will be argued that whilst unemployment is high in the 
region, it does not necessarily mean that all the unemployed are poor. To the 
extent that poverty is caused by lack of employment or poor returns to labour 
as a result of low productivity an employment policy of job creation that is 
combined with improving productivity and increasing return to labour could 
reduce poverty. However, an employment policy on its own will not be 
sufficient to tackle other deep rooted problems of poverty, deprivation and 
vulnerability. The fourth section discusses issues related to the links between 
economic growth, employment and poverty reduction, the so called 
‘employment-poverty nexus’. It will be argued that the ‘employment-poverty 
nexus’ critically depends on employment elasticity in various sectors. It will be 
shown that the current data on the impact of growth on employment reveals 
that employment has responded very slowly to growth and that governments 
can not rely on growth alone to solve either the problem of employment or 
poverty and vulnerability. This of course does not mean that economic growth 
has no role to play in the reduction of unemployment, poverty and 
vulnerability. In other words economic growth is necessary, but it is not 
sufficient to rely on economic growth to achieve the multiple objectives of 
unemployment, poverty and vulnerability. Some of the current policies in the 
MENA countries to tackle unemployment and poverty will be discussed in 
section five, and an attempt will be made to provide a summary of best 
practices.  
While looking at the experience of Arab MENA countries in dealing with 
unemployment and poverty, one should, at the outset, bear in mind their 
diversity and heterogeneity. The Arab and other MENA countries contain a 
diverse set of economic, geographic and political entities that share a cultural 
heritage, some prominent features of which are a common language and 
religion (mainly Islam, though not exclusively so). This diversity and 
heterogeneity requires country specific approaches to the design and 
implementation of employment and anti-poverty policies – ‘a one size fit all’ 
approach should be avoided. 
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2 Economic growth, poverty and inequality: an overview 
This section reviews the main macroeconomic developments in the Arab 
MENA countries with a focus on key macro indicators, structural 
transformation and poverty indicators. The MENA region is comprised of a 
range of countries with diverse social and economic histories and resource 
base. Taxonomy of economic development and structural transformation of 
these countries would provide a helpful framework for the policy options 
discussions that will come later in the paper. A framework that lays down the 
markers for the constraints that Arab MENA countries face for finding 
solutions for problems of unemployment and poverty. 
A useful taxonomy of MENA region countries has been provided by 
Richards and Waterbury (1996). Their taxonomy also covers countries that are 
not in list of Arab MENA that would be interesting to keep in the background 
for comparative purposes. Their taxonomy is fundamentally based on the 
resources – natural and human - available in the country. Let us begin with (1) 
Small countries that are only rich in oil: Libya, Kuwait, Oman, UAE, Bahrain 
and Qatar. These have very small markets and little resources to diversify their 
economies, notwithstanding the fact that Dubai in UAE has been successful in 
developing a vibrant entrepot sector and, more recently, a tourist industry. 
Immigrant labour from poorer countries of the region as well as the Indian 
subcontinent has been crucial to the development of these sectors in Dubai as 
well as the economy of this group of countries. (2) The oil industrialising 
countries of Iran, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Iraq (whose fortune has 
dramatically changed since its invasion by the US and its allies) that have 
substantial oil reserves and other natural resources as well as sufficiently large 
population allowing them to diversify their economies. Iran and Algeria have 
been more successful industrialisers than other countries in this group though 
they still rely heavily on oil for their export earnings. (3) The ‘small’ natural 
resource poor countries of Israel, Jordan, Syria and Tunisia that have been 
relatively successful in diversifying their economies through education and skill 
development and developing a sizable manufacturing sector. (4) The newly 
industrialising countries (NICs) of Turkey, Egypt and Morocco have either no 
oil (Turkey and Morocco) or insufficient amount (Egypt) that cannot be relied 
on for long term growth strategy. All have sizable populations and reasonably 
strong agricultural sector with potential for future growth. (5) In the poorest 
category are Sudan and Yemen that rely on mainly agriculture and some oil 
export as in the case of Sudan or on agriculture and worker remittances who 
work in the oil rich countries of the region as in the case of Yemen.  
It has to be reiterated that the above taxonomy should not be treated like 
a map with clear demarcated boundaries, but as a general guide as to the 
constraints facing the Arab MENA countries. Let us now turn to a 
macroeconomic view of these countries.  
Appendix table 1 provides a snapshot view of recent (since 1980) 
macroeconomic situation in a selected numbers of MENA countries for which 
consistent data have been available. Most countries except Algeria and Sudan 
have experienced a steady real GDP growth for much of the past 20 years. If 
we ignore the exceptionally high growth rates of 1980 for Egypt, Jordan and 
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Syria, the average annual growth rates were in the range of 4 – 6 per cent. 
These are respectable rates of growth that should have helped the countries in 
question to attend to some of the urgent needs of the population such as 
provision employment and alleviation of poverty.  
As will be demonstrated later, these countries achieved very modest gains 
in reducing poverty or increasing employment. For example, whilst real GDP 
per capita recorded modest increases from 1980 to 2003, the real GDP per 
person employed have been far more modest in most countries. In fact, the 
growth of real GDP per person employed were very low or even negative in 
some countries (see Appendix Table 2).  
With regard to other basic macroeconomic indicators, real per capita GDP 
in constant US dollar has also increased in all countries, with inflation being 
brought down from double digit figures of the early 1980s to a single digit by 
2000.  
In broad terms, the macroeconomic situation looks rather healthy. There 
is no runaway inflation in the countries under study; public finances seem to be 
under control and under the guidance and pressure of international financial 
institutions and sections of the local elite, all countries have opened up (Infitah)2 
their economies, in various degrees, to market forces at internal and 
international levels. Given the increasing role of private sector and integration 
of MENA countries in the world economy it would be useful to consider 
forces that shape this opening up. According to Richards and Waterbury 
(1990) ‘Infitah’ should be seen as the outcome of three interacting set of 
forces: class actors, often fostered by earlier state-led growth policies; serious 
economic difficulties, generated both by state-led growth policies and by the 
international conjuncture; and pressure from international actors….[that] does 
not mean that the public sector is about to be dismantled…[nor] state ceding 
to “civil society”. Rather than a retreat of the state, infitah is better conceived as 
a restructuring of state activity, always mediating between society and 
international actors, still responsible for the basic welfare of the population, 
and continuing to formulate the goals and strategy of economic development 
and structural change.’ (261)  
These developments have taken place against the background of structural 
transformation of Arab MENA that has been under way for quite some time. 
Industry and service sectors have long replaced agriculture as the main source 
of contribution to GDP. By 2004 the share of agriculture in GDP in most 
countries under study had dropped to less than 20 per cent. Agriculture in 
Sudan had the highest share – 39 per cent, followed by Syria – 23 per cent. But 
in most countries agriculture employs a sizable proportion of the labour force 
despite its low contribution to GDP. In Egypt, for example, about 27 per cent 
of the labour force were employed in agriculture in 2002 (see Appendix Tables 
6), whilst agriculture accounted for only 15 per cent of GDP. The 
corresponding figures for Morocco were 43.9 per cent (share of employment) 
and 16 per cent (share of GDP). In Syria, the figures are 30.3 per cent (share of 
                                                 
2 For an excellent discussion of comparative macroeconomic study of Infitah and 
other macroeconomic issues of MENA see Richards and Waterbury (1990). 
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employment) and 27 per cent (share of GDP). Among the Arab MENA 
countries, Yemen has the highest percentage of labour force working in 
agriculture – 54.1 per cent with a low contribution of agriculture to GDP – 14 
per cent. In Jordan, agriculture accounted for only 3 per cent of GDP in 2004 
but employed 11 per cent of the labour force (ILO, 2006; KILM 2004; and 
Appendix Table 6). In Algeria, agriculture accounted for 10 per cent of GDP 
in 2004 but 12.2 per cent of employment. 
The upshot of the above figures is that a large proportion of population 
working in agriculture has to rely on a proportionately low share of GDP for 
its livelihood, and that would have implications for the incidence of poverty 
among the rural population. The data on poverty reveals that in most countries 
under study poverty rates are higher in rural areas than in urban areas. 
Appendix table 3 provides data on poor population for some of the Arab 
MENA countries and their distribution between rural and urban areas. 
According to the national poverty line, 22 per cent of Algerians were 
considered to be poor in 1998. According to a similar indicator in Egypt 16 per 
cent of population were poor in 2000. Corresponding figures in other 
countries were: 19 per cent in Morocco in 1999, 35.4 per cent in Yemen in 
1998 and 7.6 per cent in Tunisia in 1995. In all countries a larger proportion of 
the poor were living in rural than in urban areas. In Tunisia, for example, four 
times as many poor were living in rural areas than in urban areas. In Morocco, 
more than twice as many poor were living in rural areas in 1999 than in urban 
areas (see figure 1). 
FIGURE 1 
 Rural versus Urban Poverty Rates in Selected MENA Countries, 2000. 
Source: Iqbal, F. (2005) Sustaining Gains in Poverty Reduction and Human Development 
in the Middle East and North Africa, World Bank, figure 1.9, p. 18. 
The scale of poverty in some of these countries increases if we use an 
international poverty line of the percentage of people below $2 a day. The 
percentage in 2000 of people below poverty line in Egypt jumps dramatically 
to 43.90. The corresponding figure for Tunisia in 1995 is 12.7 per cent. But in 
other countries, apparently there is not much of a gap between the national 
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and international criteria since the percentage of population who are poor does 
not change much when the international poverty line is used.  
As far as Jordan is concerned, only studies that use international poverty 
line are available. According to the $2 criterion, proportion of the population 
who were poor in Jordan in 1997 was 7.4 per cent, but another source (ILO, 
2006) reports a higher poverty rate of 21.3 per cent for 1997. The same source 
also reports a higher incidence of rural poverty compared with urban areas, as 
observed in other countries. Despite the difference in headcount poverty rates, 
both sources agree on the reduction in poverty – by 2002 Jordan experienced a 
33 per cent drop in poverty rate. 
An important aspect of the inter-relationship between poverty and 
employment in the developing world is the poverty of the employed people 
whose earnings are not sufficient to provide them for their most basic - 
survival - needs of nutrition, sanitation and health (that is usually measured by 
an absolute poverty line of say $1 or $2 per day). The number of the working 
poor rises if we use the more appropriate measure of relative of poverty (that 
takes account of distribution of income and expenditure as well as capability to 
participate in the society by having a voice in the running of ones’ affairs). In 
this paper the absolute poverty measures are used since the relative poverty 
measures that are country specific are not available for all countries concerned. 
In contrast, poverty in the developed world is more often than not 
associated with unemployment. However, in the 1990s in the developed world 
liberalisation of labour markets led to major and fundamental changes in the 
labour market that shifted the balance of power against labour and in favour of 
capital. Whilst some of the consequences of liberalisation of the labour market 
like reduced job security and the casualisation of work may not necessarily 
affect wages, they nevertheless increase the vulnerability of the employed 
people and affect their bargaining position that in low skill and low wage 
sectors could easily lead to poverty level wages, especially if household 
circumstances are also taken into account. For example, the poor households 
in the UK in the 1990s were female headed and those with low income (often 
single parents) and large families.  
In the developing countries any employment policy must take into 
account return to labour if it were to have a poverty reduction objective. 
Evidence on the working poor in the Arab MENA is quite striking. 
Appendix table 3 also provides the evidence on working poor – 
proportion of employed persons living in a household whose members are 
estimated to be below the poverty line ($2/day). Among the Arab MENA 
countries in the late 1990s, Egypt and Yemen had the highest share of the 
working population who were poor: 71.5 per cent (in 1999) and 73.70 per cent 
(in 1998) respectively. In the case of Yemen there was a doubling of the share 
of the working poor since 1995. The lowest percentage of the working poor 
belongs to Tunisia at 11.90 per cent in 2000 and Jordan at 12.80 per cent; and 
those figures were lower than the corresponding figures in the early 1990s. 
Morocco and Algeria, in contrast, recorded quite high percentage of working 
poor – 23.50 per cent (in 1998) and 30.50 per cent (in 1995) respectively.  
The poverty of the employed people could be due to many factors such as 
labour market conditions as well as low productivity and poor skills that in turn 
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lead to low return to labour. An excess supply of labour often pushes wages 
down, which, in the absence of minimum wage regulation, could lead to the 
poverty of the employed people, though minimum wage is often set at too low 
a level to prevent people falling below the poverty line. Low productivity could 
also result in low returns to labour that may well push the employed people 
into poverty. This is often the case of the working poor who eke out a meagre 
living in the informal sector.  
An important aspect of measurement of poverty based on poverty line is 
the treatment of those who are just above the poverty line. These are the 
people who are vulnerable to poverty because any changes in the economy 
(e.g. increase in inflation that will have price and income effects) would push 
them below the poverty line. Any anti-poverty policy that is based solely on a 
poverty line and does not address the problem of vulnerability fails to address 
the structural causes of poverty that are related to, for example, to distribution 
of assets, human capital and skills, ethnic/race/caste and gender 
discriminations.  
To have a measure of vulnerability in the MENA region, let us look at the 
percentage of poor in population at different poverty lines of $1, $2, $3 and $4 
(figure 1). Sharp increases in the percentage of the poor can be observed as we 
move up from $1. The jump is most dramatic in cases of Egypt and Yemen 
where the rates of poverty at $1 are respectively about 3 and 10 per cents that 
increases to about 42 per cent for both countries at $2. The sensitivity of 
incidence of poverty to poverty line can also be observed from response of the 
latter to the former as measured by elasticity (%change in poverty incidence 
divided by % change in poverty line). For a change in poverty line from one to 
two dollars, the elasticity of poverty incidence in Egypt is 13 and in Yemen 3.2. 
As to be expected these elasticities decline with the increase in poverty line.  
Further jumps in the percentage of the poor can be observed at $3 and $4 
but the rate of increase declines. For the richer MENA countries the jump in 
the percentage of the poor is lower as we move up from $1 to $2 than it is for 
a move from $2 to $3 and from $3 to $4. In Jordan, for example, the 
percentage of the poor is below 5 per cent at $1 and goes up to about 5 per 
cent at $2, but then jumps to about 22 per cent at $3 and 42 per cent at $4.  
The difference in the rate of increase of poverty in the poorer and richer 
group of countries may well be attributed to difference in per capita income. 
The higher the per capita income the sharper is the increase in the percentage 
of the poor as the poverty line is moved up.  
The Arab MENA countries not only need anti-poverty policies to deal 
with the sizable number of the poor, they also need to have policies that would 
monitor and provide cover for the substantial number of people who are just 
above poverty, whatever the threshold, who could join the ranks of the poor 
with slightest shifts in the economy. In Syria, for example, Islam (2006) 
estimates that about 19 per cent are considered vulnerable and go through 
periods of poverty that is almost double the percentage of the people who are 
poor - 11 per cent (p. 27) In Egypt, in 2001, the number of the poor at $2 was 
28.6 millions that would jump to 47.6 at $3. (See table 1 for the size of the 
vulnerable people in other countries). This vulnerable population of just under 
20 million people should be taken into account in the design of pro-poor social 
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policies in Egypt. At MENA level, with the use of higher threshold of poverty 
line - at $3 – the number of poor rises to 95.3 million, indicating that the 
vulnerable population at the lower poverty line of $2 is 43 millions.  
Given that the vulnerable population in Egypt accounts for about half the 
vulnerable population in the MENA region, Egypt should have a strategic 
position in regional poverty alleviation programmes of international 
organizations working in the region. 
FIGURE 2 
 Percentage Poor at Alternative Poverty Lines 
 
Source: Iqbal, F. (2005) Sustaining Gains in Poverty Reduction and Human Development 
in the Middle East and North Africa, World Bank, figure 1.8, p. 17. 
TABLE 1 
 Numbers Poor at Alternative Poverty Lines, 1987, 2001. 
 Numbers poor at $2 
(in millions) 
Numbers poor at $3 
(in millions) 
 1987 2001 1987 2001 
Algeria 2.3 5.1 6.4 11.2 
Egypt 24.2 28.6 38.0 47.6 
Iran 7.0 3.5 13.9 10.1 
Jordan 0.1 0.3 0.3 1.1 
Morocco 3.0 4.1 7.8 9.5 
Tunisia 1.3 0.5 2.7 1.7 
Yemen 2.2 9.5 4.4 14.1 
Total  40.1 51.6 73.5 95.3 
Source: Iqbal, F. (2005) Sustaining Gains in Poverty Reduction and Human Development 
in the Middle East and North Africa, World Bank, table 1.5, p. 17. 
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3 Employment and labour markets 
High natural growth of population in the region has ensured a rising labour 
supply that has outstripped labour demand in all Arab MENA countries. 
Despite the recent decline in fertility rates, the population momentum has kept 
the labour supply on the increase – the labour force in the region has been 
growing at an annual rate of 3-4 per cent since the mid-1980s. High population 
growth of the recent past also accounts for the young age structure of the 
population. At least 30 per cent of population in the Arab MENA countries 
are below the age of 15 - a critical challenge in the region is to increase labour 
demand in public and private sector. 
Unemployment has been a major problem in the region. In countries for 
which data are available the aggregate unemployment rate for males in 2003 
varies between a rather low figure of 7.3 per cent in Egypt to a high of 23.4 per 
cent in Algeria. In between is Morocco with 11.5 per cent and Jordan with 14.7 
per cent. The aggregate rates for females are in most cases higher than that for 
males with unemployment rate in Algeria being 25.4 per cent, in Egypt 23.2 per 
cent, in Morocco 13.0 per cent, and in Jordan 19.7 per cent. (KILM 2004) A 
similar picture emerges in Syria where female unemployment is slightly higher 
than male unemployment, with the largest gap being at the 20-24 age group. 
(Islam, 2005, figure 2, p. 39) 
Since 1980 the trend in male unemployment rate has been on the increase 
in Egypt and Jordan while that in Morocco has been relatively stable. 
Interestingly enough, female unemployment either has been relatively stable as 
in the case of Egypt or has had a moderate downward trend as in Algeria, 
Morocco and Jordan.  
An important feature of unemployment in the region is a very high rate of 
youth (those in the 15-24 age group) unemployment. ILO’s KILM only 
provides data on youth unemployment for a couple of countries in the region. 
In Morocco youth unemployment rates are respectively 17.4 per cent for males 
and 15.9 per cent for females. In Jordan youth unemployment rates are 
respectively 28.0 per cent for males and 43.2 per cent for females. ILO 
Country studies reveal that a large proportion of the young unemployed people 
are educated at least to secondary level. In some cases the higher the level of 
education the higher the unemployment rate. In Jordan female unemployment 
rate has been highest for those with a bachelor degree (ILO, 2006, p. 3). In 
Egypt both males and females with ‘intermediate’ education had the highest 
rates of unemployment. (Laithy and El Ehwany, 2006, appendix table 9, p. 10)  
Both supply and demand factors have been responsible for the rise in 
unemployment. On the supply side rapid population growth of earlier periods 
has increased the size of the labour force, especially the young, and on the 
demand side, economic growth and job creation have fallen far behind the 
labour supply. An interesting feature of labour supply in the Arab MENA is 
the decline or stability of male labour force participation rate (LFPR) in most 
countries, as against the rise, albeit modest, of the female LFPR. This is the 
pattern in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Syria (See Appendix Table 4) that 
poses an important question regarding the problem of female unemployment 
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in these countries. Labour market and job creation policies in the MENA 
region rarely take note of such gender difference in unemployment rates. 
On the demand side it is important know growth of employment by 
sector in order to investigate whether sectoral distribution of employment has 
changed and whether a shift of labour from sectors with low productivity to 
those with higher productivity has been taking place, that could, in turn, help 
in reducing poverty. As noted earlier there has been a sectoral shift away from 
agriculture, but the gain in employment in the industrial sector has been very 
modest in most MENA countries for which data is available. Within the 
industrial sector the manufacturing sector employment has had a very 
disappointing employment record. KILM provides data for the manufacturing 
employment in very few (Egypt, Iran, Morocco) of the larger countries of the 
MENA region. In all of them, the share of manufacturing in total employment 
as well as the volume of employment in the manufacturing sector has been 
stagnant over the years. The data indicates that whatever productivity gain 
might have taken place in these countries, it has come about more from higher 
sectoral productivities (that is people in different sectors have been increasing 
their productivity through the use of more capital and other resources) than a 
shift from low productivity to high productivity sectors. But it is interesting to 
note that female employment in manufacturing has gone up, albeit modestly in 
all the countries concerned.  
The service sector, which has absorbed much of the increase in the labour 
force in the MENA region, is composed of a diverse range of activities _ 
ranging from high productivity and high return sectors such as banking, 
insurance and finance at one extreme to very low productivity and low return 
street vendors on the other. To investigate whether the service sector can or 
will be able to play a major role in poverty reduction we need to see which sub-
sectors of the service sector have been growing and have the potential to 
provide high productivity and high wage jobs to the unemployed and under-
employed labour force. The available data for the larger countries of MENA 
that have the most serious unemployment and poverty problems indicate that 
the high productivity, high return sectors are a very small sub-set of the 
growing service sector, and have also been growing very slowly. The trade and 
small scale repair shops (motor as well as household goods) are the only sub-
sectors that have been showing some sign of growth. A large proportion of 
this sub-sector could be considered informal with low productivity and low 
returns. However, it would be of interest to know the composition of this 
sector both in terms of products and skills as well as its linkages with other 
sectors in order to investigate its potential for productivity growth. Very little 
information is available on these aspects of the informal sector. 
Finally, we should consider the labour demand of the public and private 
sector and its change over time. There is a large variation in the MENA region 
in the share of public sector employment in total employment. On the high 
end of the spectrum are Egypt (with a figure of 60 per cent in 1998) and 
Jordan (with a figure of 56 per cent in 1998), and on the low end are Algeria 
(with a figure of 25 per cent in 2004), Syria (with a figure of 26 per cent in 
2003) and Yemen (with a figure of 11 per cent in the 2003). In all these 
countries the share of public sector employment has either been falling over 
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the years or, at best, it has been fairly stable (as is the case in Syria and Jordan). 
The mirror image of the these figures is the private sector employment that 
would employ 89 per cent of the labour force in Yemen, at one extreme, and 
40 per cent in Egypt, at the other. (KILM 2004) This raises very important 
questions with regard to the role of public and private sectors in creating good 
quality jobs in the future, in particular, when one considers the pressures on 
the public sector finances. How to improve the capacity of the private sector 
to increase its supply of high quality jobs would depend on a range of factors: 
level of demand in the economy, government tax and subsidy policies, labour 
market rules and regulations, and complementarities between public sector 
investment (in particular in the area of education and infrastructure) and 
private sector investment. 
4 The linkages between growth, employment and poverty 
An understanding of the relationship between output growth, employment and 
poverty reduction – the so called ‘employment-poverty nexus’- is important for 
the design of employment policies to tackle poverty. The impact of output 
growth on poverty is mediated through several channels working at the macro 
level. Output growth could potentially increase government tax revenue and 
therefore its capacity to raise expenditure on the goods and services that are 
essential for poverty alleviation. In other words growth of output underpins 
the sustainability of a pro-poor social policy. Another macro level channel is 
the relationship between output growth and employment. If more people are 
employed to increase output, the growth in employment could take people out 
of poverty if it were due to unemployment. Moreover, growth in output and 
general improvement of the economy would lead to increased demand for 
goods and services that in turn raise the demand for labour and more job 
creation and employment. 
In so far as the impact of output growth on employment is concerned the 
current literature tries to address the seemingly two contradictory objectives: 
increasing productivity or increasing employment (see, for example, Khan, 
2001, Osmani, 2003, 2005, Islam, 2004). Higher productivity may indeed imply 
that output growth would not be linked to employment growth, other things 
being equal. In such circumstances, the employed poor would be paid more for 
producing more, with little impact on level and growth of employment. On the 
other hand, increasing employment could be at the expense of higher 
productivity. In the face of high number of the unemployed people, some of 
whom may not be poor, there is pressure on governments to increase 
employment (for example through output growth) in order to reduce open 
unemployment. There is of course no guarantee that the poor would have 
access to the newly created jobs because of their lack of skills or discrimination 
against them, or, in general, because of their poor integration in the labour 
market (Osmani, 2003). 
 There are, however, other forces at work. In the short run, output growth 
may not be associated with higher employment but over time the multiplier 
impact of growth on spending (on the demand side of the goods market) as 
well as improved profitability because of higher productivity (only part of the 
productivity gain is passed on to workers as an increase in return to labour, 
while the rest is retained as profits) would lead to increase investment and 
higher demand for labour, leading to higher employment.  
At a more general level the response of employment to growth should also 
be taken into account. So long as the elasticity of employment with respect to 
growth of output is less than unity, job creation need not be at the expense of 
productivity growth. What emerges from the data on the response of 
employment to growth, i.e. the growth elasticity of employment, confirms the 
complexity of the growth-employment nexus. Everywhere in the MENA 
region, except Syria, growth elasticity of employment are less than unity 
indicating that growth of employment has lagged behind output growth (see 
appendix Table 7). This may not be considered a bad news from the point of 
view of growth in labour productivity. A closer inspection of employment 
elasticities reveal that agriculture in general has a better performance in 
generating employment than other sectors. In six countries employment 
elasticities in agricultural sector are larger than those in other sectors whilst in 
five countries (Algeria, Iran, Tunisia, Syria and Yemen) they are in fact larger 
than unity. This is a positive development because poverty in MENA region, 
as noted earlier, has a strong rural bias. However, the question remains as to 
whether such rates of growth of employment, on their own, are sufficient to 
tackle deep rooted poverty in rural and urban areas.3 
A couple of points are in order with respect to sectoral elasticities, with 
important policy implication for employment creation. In agriculture, an 
employment elasticity greater than unity may well reflect the supply side of 
labour market that combined with a labour intensive agricultural techniques 
means higher labour inputs and higher output. In this situation, higher output 
results from the application of the abundant input – labour – to fixed inputs – 
capital and land – that at best yields higher output at a constant level of 
productivity (under the condition of constant returns to scale). In this context 
a labour intensive employment policy will not necessarily improve living 
standards as output per head will not increase. Here a combined policy of 
improving agricultural technology and channelling a rising rural labour supply 
to more productive sector in urban areas or non-farm sector in rural areas 
would be able to achieve both objectives of increasing employment and 
productivity (Auer and Islam, 2006).  
The second point is related to the employment elasticity in the 
manufacturing sector. This is a reflection of demand for labour in this sector. 
In the presence of excess capacity in manufacturing it is more likely than not 
that output growth could take place without sizable increase in demand for 
labour and increased employment. The challenge for policy makers is to raise 
                                                 
3 For a discussion of some of the limitations of using employment elasticities see 
KILM (2005), Ch. 8. 
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employment intensity of this sector while trying to maintain and increase 
labour productivity. 
Current evidence on the impact of growth on poverty in developing and 
transition countries suggests that for growth to make an impact on poverty 
through the medium of employment, several conditions have to be in place. 
Growth must be oriented towards sectors with high poverty rates, the so called 
elasticity condition. The poor in these sectors must be in a position to take 
advantage of employment and increased remuneration for their labour, the so 
called integrability condition. If created jobs are skill intensive and poor lack 
these skills then obviously the poor will not be the direct beneficiaries of jobs 
created. Or if growth takes place in sectors where the poor are not 
economically active they will not be the direct beneficiaries. Growth based in 
the manufacturing sector will not benefit the agricultural sector directly, though 
over time higher return to labour in the manufacturing sector could attract 
labour from the agricultural sector and eventually increase returns to labour 
engaged in agriculture. 
Another issue related to the impact of growth on poverty is changes in the 
returns to labour and degree to which developments in labour productivity are 
translated into higher returns to labour. Whilst increased labour productivity 
could potentially lead to higher economic growth but this does not necessary 
lead to higher returns to labour. It all depends on whether labour can claim a 
share of the expanding output.  
Trends in real wages are not available for all the MENA countries and 
where they exist they are limited to the manufacturing sector. The available 
evidence suggests a declining or at bests a modest increase in real wages in the 
1990s and early 21st century. In the case of Algeria (1992-1996), Egypt (1982-
2003), and Jordan (1995-2001) real wage registered a decline whilst in Iran 
there has been a modest increase between 1995 and 2001 (KILM 2004). We 
should be cautious not to generalise on the basis of the limited evidence on 
return to labour, yet these trends in real wages are hardly encouraging, in 
particular when data on real GDP per employed persons are considered. In 
Egypt, for example, the index of real GDP per person has gone up by 40 per 
cent between 1980 and 2003. That, compared with the decline in real wages 
over the same period, clearly indicates that the growth of the economy has 
hardly been reflected in the growth of real wages. In Iran the real GDP per 
person employed grew by about 20 per cent between 1990 and 2003 whilst the 
index of real wages between 1994 and 2001 grew by 13 per cent. In Algeria and 
Jordan the real GDP per person employed declined by 30 per cent between 
1980 and 2003 (see Appendix Table 1). These trends are also reflected in the 
indicators of inequality. The Gini index of inequality in Egypt went up from 
0.32 in 1991 to 0.34 in 2000 and that in Iran registered a small rise between 
1994 (0.43) and 1998 (0.44). In contrast inequality has declined in Jordan with 
the Gini in 1997 being 0.36 compared with 0.43 in 1992 (see Appendix Table 
3). In short, the benefits of growth have not trickled down to large sections of 
the population and in particular to those in the potentially (in terms of 
productivity gain) most dynamic sector of the economy. 
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5 How to strengthen the link between economic growth 
and employment, and reduce poverty? 
Improving employment and poverty reduction outcomes of economic growth 
is a policy objective with many dimensions: time horizon (whether short-run or 
long-run); sectoral (which sector has to be targeted and for what objective – 
poverty alleviation through job creation or poverty alleviation through 
increasing productivity/return to labour); technological (how to manage the 
adoption of capital intensive technology to raise productivity given the relative 
abundance of labour and high unemployment), and labour market (how to 
ensure that the poor are the beneficiaries of job creation).  
Distinction should be made between short run policies to alleviate poverty 
and vulnerability and long term policies to change the dynamics of poverty and 
vulnerability. Both have employment dimensions. But it has to be emphasised 
that the problem of poverty and vulnerability is not simply a matter of the right 
employment policy nor is it just a matter of economic growth. In this context 
we need first to distinguish between the short-run (one to two years) and long 
run (five to 10 years) policies and their impacts. Secondly, all macro-, meso- or 
micro-economic policies should be designed with a short-run or long-run 
policy objectives in mind. This is important because it is quite possible that the 
long-run objectives could clash with short-run impacts of a policy. For 
example, a long-run policy of diversification of the economic structure towards 
a more productive industrial and agricultural sector will not necessarily boost 
employment in the short-run. 
In other words, there may not be much of an ‘growth-employment nexus’ 
in the short-run, but gradually the demand for labour picks up as the 
diversification of the economy takes root, growth is consolidated and demand 
for labour shifts to a higher level with the expansion of service and 
manufacturing sectors.  
Such time frames are also present, implicitly or explicitly, in the policy 
recommendations of the country studies that the ILO initiated on the Arab 
MENA to alleviate poverty and increase employment. The other notable 
lesson of these studies is their heterodox approach to solving the problems of 
unemployment and poverty. 
At macro level fiscal and monetary policies should be growth orientated, 
counter-cyclical and designed with employment and stability of prices and real 
incomes. Such a macroeconomic policy framework is as much as about the 
capacity of the state to finance its anti-poverty and vulnerability policies as it is 
about providing a stable macroeconomic environment that protects people’s 
real incomes and provides the backdrop to private sector economic activities 
and job creation. These objectives have not been fulfilled by the adoption of 
tight fiscal and monetary policies that have been based on neoclassical 
economic approach to the underlying causes of economic imbalance in 
developing countries. For example a strict monetarist approach to the problem 
of inflation views inflation as the result of a lax fiscal and monetary policy, 
paying little attention to the underlying structural features of many developing 
countries that have been behind the inflationary experiences of in the 
developing world. (Eshag, 1981) The rich literature on the debate between 
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structuralist and monetarist approaches to the problems of inflation and other 
macroeconomic imbalances, has in the least established that the application of 
‘one size fits all’ approach of the IMF-World Bank in the 1980s has failed to 
achieve the twin objectives of growth and price stability in most developing 
countries. 
The experience of orthodox stabilisation and structural adjustment 
programmes of the 1980s have shown that a more nuanced approach to the 
problem of macroeconomic imbalance is needed, that at the theoretical level 
one should draw on more than one perspective whilst paying attention to the 
economic and social structure of any country. This has led to the emergence of 
heterodox approach that has combined various elements of neoclassical, 
Keynesian, post-Keynesian and other perspectives to come up with practical 
solutions to tackle the problems of high inflation, unemployment, low growth, 
and balance of payments deficit.  
The question of macroeconomic stability requires a clear understanding of 
price formation and inflationary pressure. If, as in Yemen, the source of 
inflationary pressure is in the agricultural sector, with food prices leading price 
rises in other sectors (McKinley and Mehran, 2006), a simple control of money 
supply will not achieve its anti-inflationary objective, whilst it may well 
exacerbate the unemployment problem. McKinley and Mehran (2006) have 
suggested a short run policy of stabilising food prices in order to dampen 
inflationary pressures and maintain real incomes and improve international 
competitiveness of Yemen in the non-oil sector. Their long run policy takes a 
more structuralist approach of tackling the structural bottlenecks in production 
through investment in infrastructure in particular, and in agriculture, to raise 
productivity and income. 
The short-run negative impact of tight fiscal and monetary policies on 
employment is well known. The neoclassical orthodoxy suggests that a rising 
unemployment is the price of past irresponsible expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies. Whilst the imprudence of populist expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies cannot be denied, a simple tightening of the belt of public 
finance and money supply could plunge the country into severe recession as 
well as fail to reduce inflation. It is, therefore, advisable to rely on a more 
targeted approach in the short-run: control food prices but offer subsidies to 
producers to maintain profitability of agriculture.  
Control of public finances is an issue of public expenditure as well as 
public income (taxes, foreign exchange earnings, etc.). Typical low ratio of tax 
to total government revenue in many countries (in the range of 10 – 20 per 
cent) is cause for concern. Tax on goods and services on the other hand 
provides a substantial part of the government revenue in many MENA 
countries – e.g., 46 per cent in Lebanon and 40 per cent in Morocco in 2004 
(KILM 2004). Notwithstanding the regressive nature of taxes on goods and 
services, it is imperative that MENA countries revise and strengthen their 
direct taxation policy in order to increase their tax yield and invest the money 
on essential infrastructure schemes as well as on their prop-poor welfare 
projects. Poverty reduction cannot be achieved without a strong involvement 
of the state. The stronger state finances, the more power it has to tackle the 
problems of poverty and vulnerability. A more general rethinking about 
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allocation of state expenditure should also be put on the agenda. The most 
important item on state expenditure that should come under scrutiny is the 
defence expenditure; its decline would release resources for other sectors, the 
social sector in particular. 
As far as the ‘employment-poverty nexus’ is concerned the issues of 
elasticity and integrability have to be addressed in order to ensure that benefits 
of growth reach the poorer sections of the population. Here again, a 
distinction should be drawn between the short and long run objectives, and 
also, note should be taken of the more strategic issue of reducing poverty 
among the working poor by increasing their labour productivity. The conflict 
between maximisation of employment and maximisation of output in the 
short-run has been one of the dilemmas of development economics for 
decades.  
In the short-run, as many of the country studies argue, labour intensive 
and low skill public work projects that would satisfy both the elasticity and 
integrability conditions should be on the agenda. Public works however have in 
general been temporary activities with the objective of alleviating social and 
economic distress. Besides offering temporary employment and income, 
particularly important during periods of distress in the region caused by, for 
example, floods and draughts, public works, if properly planned and 
implemented, will improve local infrastructure and lead to the growth and 
development of a region, thus leading to long term investment and job 
creation. Another region-wide effect of public work is the impact they have on 
general level of wages. Even a temporary increase in demand for labour as a 
result of public work projects may well lead to a tightening of labour market in 
the area, and that, in turn, could improve the bargaining position of the 
workers. 
In general, successful public works projects that have the objective of 
providing some basic financial support to the poor should be based on two 
principles of self-selectivity of the poor and maximising the labour input of the 
project. Its timing should also be a factor. Setting the wage at or just below the 
minimum-wage in the area may well ensure that the non-poor would not be 
attracted to the project, and using labour intensive techniques would maximise 
the labour demand of the project. International standards require 40-50 per 
cent of the total costs of road projects to be devoted to labour, while the figure 
for road or drainage maintenance to be in the region of 70-80 per cent 
(Subbarao, 2003). For water, the experience of such projects in the MENA 
region is varied in terms of reaching the poor. In some countries like Yemen 
and Morocco, labour content has been as low as 30 per cent and skilled labour 
from outside the region has been the main beneficiary (Iqbal, 2005). However, 
the use of targeted public work projects has been recommended for Yemen to 
alleviate poverty in rural areas. McKinley and Mehran (2005) recommend 
targeting of small scale and labour intensive public works on rural roads and 
irrigation projects that, while offering some temporary respite to the poor, 
would improve rural infrastructure. At the same time investment in rural area 
in other public goods such as storage, transportation network and water 
management, combined with rural micro-credit projects, would also help the 
poor farmers (pp. 15-16). 
 20
Whilst there may be a case to make public works a permanent feature of 
government job creation for the poor (as in Morocco and Tunisia with 
recurrent drought), in the long run, creation of jobs with high productivity 
should be the aim, and that requires strategic decisions at national level with 
regard to the industrial and agricultural policies. In agriculture in particular, 
productivity increase and increasing the value added of agricultural products 
should be on the agenda of rural development and rural employment policies. 
Promotion of agro-industries (like food processing) and other off farm 
activities would help reduce rural poverty. Such activities could be assisted 
through direct subsidies as well as market information and general support by 
governments.  
The issue of support for the private sector has to go beyond the 
agricultural sector and cover the large and burgeoning urban informal sector, 
where the great majority of the urban poor eke out a living, as well as sectors, 
that rely on temporary or semi-permanent unskilled labour of the poor. The 
construction and service sectors are the most prominent examples of 
temporary employers of unskilled labour. With the service sector employing 
nearly half of the employed population in MENA region (ILO, 2005, Box 4.b), 
this sector has to come for special attention for any policy that aims at 
improving the living standard of the working poor.  
This is all the more important if we consider the fact that the urban 
private sector in some of the MENA region is dominated by establishments 
that employ less than 10 people. According to some estimates, such micro and 
small enterprises comprised about 95 per cent of the non-agricultural private 
sector firms in Egypt, employing about 80 per cent of private sector 
employment in the 1990s (Laithy and el Ehwany, 2006, p. 32). In Yemen such 
enterprises employed about 50 per cent of those in paid employment in 2002, 
if we include the next category of small firms employing 10-19 workers 
(McKinley and Mehran, 2005, p. 8). Despite their contribution to employment, 
these enterprises make a very small contribution to GDP, reflecting their very 
low labour productivity. Another characteristic of these establishments is their 
lack of stability and growth – they either cannot survive the competition or are 
stuck in stagnant economic activities. In Yemen the micro enterprises (those 
employing less than 5 workers) had the largest loss of employment in 2002 
(ibid., p. 8). Finally, the majority of those working in the micro and small 
enterprises are, at best, unskilled and poorly educated who can barely make a 
living, and are aptly described in the Egyptian Central Bank reports as 
‘economically active poor.’ (Quoted in Laithy and el Ehwany, 2006, p. 34). 
These conclusions are shared by reports on Egypt and Yemen and may well be 
applicable to other countries.  
Whilst it is important not to undermine these small undertakings as they 
provide a minimum income for a large section of the population, it is wrong to 
assume that piecemeal approach (such as providing small loans or stopping 
police harassment) can solve the problem of poverty among the working poor. 
Let us now consider some of the policies that have been proposed in support 
of the micro/small/medium enterprises. 
Micro-finance and facilitating the work of the micro/small/medium sized 
enterprises have been two of the main policy instruments for reaching the poor 
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in the informal sector. There have been major developments in the provision 
and coverage (in particular of women, who comprise 60 per cent of the clients) 
in the MENA region. And yet, rural areas, where the majority of the poor live, 
have not been the main beneficiaries, except in Tunisia where 57 per cent of 
clients in 2003 were based in rural areas. In other countries the percentage of 
rural clients varies from 13 per cent in Egypt to 24 per cent in Jordan 
(Brandsma and Bajourjee, 2004). According to Laithy and el Ehwany (2006), 
lack of access to organised and formal financial markets has been a major 
handicap for micro/small enterprises in Egypt. Despite improvement in recent 
years in the availability of credit to these enterprises through the formal 
banking sector as well as specialised NGOs, in Egypt, the authors recommend 
a more market oriented approach in order to the reduce the role of subsidy and 
improve efficiency in the provision of micro finance, while recommending that 
the government should create an enabling environment for the provision of 
micro finance. They also call for better coordination on the part of all 
stakeholders - i.e. the commercial banks, the Social Fund for Development, the 
government, and the NGOs (pp. 35-36). It is interesting to note that the micro 
and small enterprises themselves are conspicuously absent from this list of 
stakeholders that could be due to the lack of organisation and therefore 
representation of the poor at the policy table. A policy of clustering (see below) 
of micro/small and medium enterprises could help the poor who are working 
in these enterprises to organise themselves and get a voice in policy making 
and implementation.  
Another short-run policy is to reduce the rules and regulation for the small 
and medium size enterprises, or where the rules exist, ensure that they are 
enforced in public interest (like in public health areas) or to protect the work 
force (e.g. in areas of social insurance). Enforcement of these rules has cost 
implications for small enterprises, and governments could provide direct 
subsidy to them to reduce their operating costs. Tax policies should also be 
sensitive to the needs of such enterprises.  
In the medium and long-run, state intervention is needed to increase the 
access of small and medium enterprises to technology and training in order to 
improve their productivity. It should be noted that without increasing the 
return to labour of the working poor, the anti-poverty policy will not be 
sustainable. The linkages between these enterprises and other sectors should be 
another area for policy makers. As the experience of East Asian newly 
industrialised countries shows, increasing the locally sourced inputs in the large 
enterprises increases the link between large and small/medium enterprises and 
expands the demand for their goods and services. Governments should 
provide information on potential linkages as well as offer incentives to 
encourage such linkages. Government’s purchase policies can play an 
important role in strengthening the link between small/medium and large 
enterprises.  
ILO (2005) approaches the micro/small/medium enterprises both from 
the point of view of improved efficiency and profitability as well as improved 
workers’ rights, labour productivity and remuneration. The ILO recommends 
clustering of micro/small/medium enterprises in order to improve their 
productivity and competitiveness. Clustering could improve the capacity of 
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collective bargaining of micro/small/medium sized firms for purchasing 
inputs, negotiating for credit as well as bidding for large contracts that are 
beyond the capacity of individual firms in the cluster.4 The applicability of 
general policy prescriptions of the ILO with regard to the support of 
micro/small/medium sized enterprises should be explored further in the 
MENA region and integrated in the existing debate on the employment 
generating potential of these enterprises in the region.  
As noted earlier, the poor have very little say in the design and 
implementation of policies that affect them. Freedom of association, collective 
bargaining at social and a more general level would help the poor to organize 
and put their interests and demands on the policy agenda. Empowerment of 
the poor should be coupled with improving the security of their earnings (in 
such cases as illness, disability and unemployment) through social insurance 
programmes whilst ensuring the property rights of their enterprises (ILO, 
2005). 
It would be no exaggeration to state that youth unemployment is one of 
the most acute economic and social problems in the MENA region. This is 
more an issue of resource use – how to harness the skills and energy of a 
young population? – than one of poverty alleviation, considering that the 
unemployed youth are not generally poor. However, surveys of youth 
unemployment in Egypt have revealed that the educated poor have a higher 
rate of unemployment than the educated non-poor. In the Egyptian context, 
poverty aggravates the unemployment situation of the educated poor for two 
reasons. Poverty is usually associated with low level of social capital (that 
provide a host of information networks and access to power) helping 
individuals from richer backgrounds to access the limited job openings (Laithy 
and el Ehwany, 2006). In other words educated and unemployed youth from 
richer backgrounds fulfil the integrability condition better than the educated 
youth who are poor.  
Youth unemployment, of course, has been a preoccupation in many 
countries and international agencies like the UN and the ILO have undertaken 
a good deal work on causes and policy issues related to this problem. The 
ILO’s general policy recommendations are improvement in: ‘Employability: 
invest in education and vocational training for young people – and improve the 
impact of these investments; Equal opportunities: give young women the same 
opportunities as young men; Entrepreneurship: make it easier to start and run 
enterprises to provide more and better jobs for young women and men; 
Employment creation: place employment creation at the centre of macro-
economic policy’ (ILO, April 2007). To operationalise these policies, one needs 
detailed information on the various aspects of youth unemployment such as 
their skill composition and labour market conditions. This information is 
lacking at present and there is an urgent need to conduct studies on youth 
unemployment in the region. The available information from Egypt suggests 
that the unemployed youth are not necessarily poor and that they are better 
educated than the poor. The rate of job creation and the skill demand does not 
match the rate at which youth enter the labour market but without the right 
                                                 
4 For further details see ILO (2005), ch. 5. Also see UNIDO (2001). 
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skills. It has been observed in Egypt that as the pace of privatisation quickens, 
the emerging private sector needs more educated and more flexible work force, 
especially in engineering and computer sciences that are currently in short 
supply (Laithy and el Ehwany, 2006). Similar concerns were also raised by 
participants from other MENA countries in the UNDP/ILO conference in 
Cairo (21-23 November 2006) about the quality of education and mismatch of 
skills between supply of and demand for labour.  
The gender gap in youth unemployment is another concern in the MENA 
countries. Only in Morocco, the female youth unemployment rate is lower 
than that for males. The opposite has been observed in other countries. The 
gap in youth unemployment rates ranges from a small difference in Algeria 
(42.8 per cent for males and 46.3 per cent for females, in 2004) to a very large 
one in Egypt (21.4 per cent for males and 40.0 per cent for females, in 2002) 
(KILM 2004). Whilst gender discrimination in the labour market is one factor 
in explaining these differences, there may well be gender differences in the type 
of skill supply of the young and what the labour market demands. Further 
research in this area should help in focusing the policy recommendations of 
the ILO on eliminating gender discrimination in the labour market as well as 
trying to deal with one of the root causes of discrimination that goes back to 
the gender discrimination at the level of education and skill development. 
The general thrust of the policy discussion so far has been directed at the 
creation of jobs and improving productivity and return to labour in order to 
reduce poverty. The implicit assumption has been to create jobs where the 
poor are situated, yet current trends and history shows that migration in search 
of a better living, either nationally or internationally, has been a major route to 
overcome poverty. In fact the structural transformation of developed countries 
of today would not have been possible without large scale labour migration 
from rural to urban areas, that provided the background for the classical 
theorisation of how accumulation can take place with the creation of a reserve 
army of labour that keeps wages down and increases profits (Marx, 1990) or an 
accumulation with an unlimited supply of labour that is transferred from low 
to high productivity sector (Lewis, 1953). 
Internal migratory movements, mainly rural-urban, in the MENA region 
have significantly contributed to urbanisation and fast growing urban 
economies, particularly the service sector. The informal sector has also been 
one of the main recipients of migrants. International migration has also been 
very strong in the region _ mainly from Egypt and Yemen to the oil exporting 
Persian Gulf states and from North African countries to France and other 
European countries. Most of these migratory flows have taken place without 
much formal organisation. It is time for the governments in the region to 
integrate migration in their employment and anti-poverty strategies, especially 
if they want to combine employment policy with a growth oriented strategy 
and structural transformation of the economy that would utilise labour 
resources in the high productivity sector.  
On the internal front, development of growth poles in the country and 
channelling of investment by providing incentives for private capital into 
specific regions would provide a focus for local migratory movements that may 
otherwise be channelled to the bigger cities which already take the lion share of 
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investment as well as become the main destination for migrants. Development 
of such growth poles of course would depend on the resource base and 
potential of each country and regions within them. Development of these 
growth poles could also be combined with an agricultural support strategy to 
raise labour productivity in agriculture. In fact drawing labour from agriculture 
would inevitably increase labour productivity if agricultural output were to 
remain constant.  
With regard to international migration governments should use the 
existing migratory networks and provide information on demand for labour 
and try to coordinate migratory flows based on the demand for specific skills. 
Through bi-lateral agreements it would be possible to reduce the illegal flows. 
The fact that a large number of illegal immigrants work in the recipient country 
should be sufficient reason for the authorities in receiving countries to 
cooperate with the sending countries to organise an orderly channel for 
international migration. Migration should be viewed more as a labour issue 
than a security issue which is the current view in almost all countries, where 
immigration matters are handled first by security forces (ministries of interior 
and defence who are usually in charge of borders) and ministry of justice. It 
would be a great step forward to free movement of labour, as part of the 
human rights of individuals, if migration were to be de-securitised (for the 
want of a better word) and let administrative structures that deal with labour 
matters to handle it. Some countries like the Philippines (as a major emigration 
country) and Spain (as an immigrant country in the late 20th century) have 
moved in this direction while the immigrant countries of Canada, the US and 
Australia have always been sensitive to the needs of the labour market and 
treated migration as a labour issue.  
Besides easing off the problem of unemployment, immigration would also 
help the balance of payments deficit as well as reduce the savings gap. The 
problem here is not so much to facilitate the flow of remittances but to 
channel the remittances into productive projects. Part of the remittances will 
always be consumed, but governments can provide an enabling environment 
through tax concessions and other policies to help channel remittances to 
productive investment to create jobs and improve productivity. The precise 
modalities of such policies require further research, and have to take account 
of specific country needs and institutional infrastructure.  
Last but not least, governments should also increase their expenditure on 
activities that would increase the welfare of the poor, like health, nutrition, 
housing, sanitation and education. This should be possible in a climate of 
economic growth that provides governments with increased resources either in 
the form of extra tax revenue or increased export earnings in the case of oil 
and mineral exporting countries. 
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6 Conclusion 
Despite steady economic growth in most Arab MENA countries the region 
achieved very modest gains in reducing poverty or increasing employment. 
Poverty and unemployment, especially among the young, are widespread in the 
region. Employment has shown to be a partial answer to the question of 
poverty. The majority of the poor (using the static concept of poverty line, e.g., 
$1 per head) are working in rural areas and in low productivity activities. The 
‘growth-employment-poverty nexus’ has not been sufficiently successful in 
alleviating poverty in the Arab MENA mainly because of low growth 
elasticities of employment and low integration of the poor, because of for 
example lack of skill, in the labour markets where new jobs are created. Yet the 
importance of employment and secure return to labour (whether it is termed a 
decent wage or a living income) cannot be over-estimated. What is needed 
above all is an employment policy that puts the emphasis on strengthening the 
growth-employment nexus by promoting job creation and improving the 
access of the poor to such jobs. At the same time more targeted poverty 
reduction policies are needed that should not only improve the income earning 
opportunities of the poor but also raise their incomes. Anti-poverty policies 
should also be put in place to provide support for a large number of people 
who are just above poverty line and thus vulnerable to poverty in case of 
minor deterioration in the macroeconomic conditions or their poverty stricken 
household economy. MENA countries that have been successful in tackling 
poverty and vulnerability have relied on a range of policies: macroeconomic 
stability, pro-poor short-term employment policies (through labour intensive 
public work projects and by focusing on sectors where poor are concentrated) 
and improving opportunities for the poor in order that they would benefit 
from employment growth (improving ‘integrability’ of the poor). These 
countries have also improved the health, education, housing and sanitary 
conditions of the poor by increasing their social expenditure, and by putting in 
place income support measures and by maintaining subsidies on goods 
consumed by the poor. Finally successful anti-poverty policies have also 
improved the poors’ access to financial (through micro finance) and other 
productive resources such as land. 
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Appendix Tables 
Table 1 
Selected annual macroeconomic indicators, 1980-2003 
Selected Middle East and North African countries 
  Real GDP growth (%) Inflation rate (%) 1/ Per capita real GDP (2000 US$) Real GDP per person employed  
(1980=100) 2/ 
Country 1980 1990 2000 2003 1980 1990 2000 2003 1980 1990 2000 2003 1980 1990 2000 2003 
Algeria 0.80 0.80 2.40 6.80 14.94 16.40 0.30 2.55 1,841 1,804 1,759 1,916 100.00 85.90 67.80 69.10 
          (1981)               (-1.50) (-4.77) (-1.31) (2.83)  
Egypt 10.00 5.70 5.10 3.20 10.11 16.76 2.67 4.47 934 1,240 1,554 1,622 100.00 127.00 139.80 140.20 
          (1981)               (1.40) (3.32)  (3.13) (1.39) 
Iran 12.80 11.20 5.00 6.60 22.73 7.41 14.42 16.51 1,278 1,196 1,511 1,715 100.00 92.20 102.70 108.60 
          (1981)               (-6.40) (7.96) (1.78) (2.74) 
Morocco 3.60 4.00 1.00 5.20 12.76 6.92 1.94 1.16 945 1,111 1,161 1,278 100.00 113.30 111.20 119.40 
          (1981)               (-5.20) (1.43)  (-1.33)  (2.75) 
Sudan 1.50 5.50 6.50 6.00 50.00 100.00 5.71 - 283 281 388 433 100.00 85.00 106.60 117.00 
          (1989)               (-1.20) (-1.20) (7.29)  (3.28) 
Tunisia 7.40 8.00 4.70 5.60 8.97 6.45 2.88 2.67 1,353 1,503 2,036 2,215 - - - - 
          (1984)                       
Jordan 19.00 1.00 4.20 3.20 7.69 16.23 0.70 2.41 1,939 1,624 1,732 1,801 100.00 83.40 68.30 69.40 
          (1981)               (0.20)  (-4.25)  (-0.29) (-0.29) 
Lebanon - 26.50 0.50 2.70 - - - - - 2,280 3,810 3,925 - - - - 
Syria 12.00 7.60 0.60 2.50 18.52 19.38 -3.85 0.97 1,011 902 1,115 1,135 100.00 90.80 105.30 104.20 
          (1981)     (2002)         (6.10)  (4.37)  (-3.31)  (-1.14)  
Yemen - - 6.50 3.80 - 36.61 4.60 10.83 - 453 538 553 100.00 94.30 112.40 114.90 
            (1991)             (2.00) (-3.87) (1.90) (0.00) 
1/ The years directly below the rate refers to the earliest data available. 2/ The first line refers to the index of real GDP per annual working hours of employed persons. Directly below is 
the growth rate of the index. In 1980, the growth refers to 1981. - Data not available. Source: 2004 Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM) , 4th Edition (Table A.1: Macroeconomic, 
social and human development and Table 18a: Labour productivity, and unit labour costs, total economy) 
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Table 2 
Real GDP growth and real GDP growth per person employed 
Middle East and North African countries 
  Real GDP growth (%) Real GDP growth per person employed (%) 1/ 
Country 1980 1990 2000 2003 1981 1990 2000 2003 
          
Algeria 0.80 0.80 2.40 6.80 -1.50 -4.77 -1.31 2.83 
Egypt 10.00 5.70 5.10 3.20 1.40 3.32 3.13 1.39 
Iran 12.80 11.20 5.00 6.60 -6.40 7.96 1.78 2.74 
Morocco 3.60 4.00 1.00 5.20 -5.20 1.43 -1.33 2.75 
Sudan 1.50 5.50 6.50 6.00 -1.20 -1.20 7.29 3.28 
Tunisia 7.40 8.00 4.70 5.60 - - - - 
Jordan 19.00 1.00 4.20 3.20 0.20 -4.25 -0.29 -0.29 
Lebanon - 26.50 0.50 2.70 - - - - 
Syria 12.00 7.60 0.60 2.50 6.10 4.37 -3.31 -1.14 
Yemen - - 6.50 3.80 2.00 -3.87 1.90 0.00 
1/ Computed as the ratio of real GDP growth and growth of annual working hours of employed persons. 
- Data not available. 
Source: 2004 Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM) , 4th Edition (Table 1a: Macroeconomic, social and human development and Table 18a: Labour 
productivity and unit labour costs, total economy). 
 
 29
Table 3 
Selected poverty indicators, 1991-2000 
Selected Middle East and North African countries 
National poverty line (%) International poverty 
line (%) 
International poverty 
gap (%) 
Share of working 
poor at US$2/day 
Country (Survey period) 
National Rural Urban 
(Survey period) 
(population below 
US$2/day) 
(population below 
US$2/day) 1/ 
in total employment 
(%)  
GINI 
Index 
Algeria (1995) 22.60 30.30 14.70 (1995) 15.10 3.60 30.50 35.30 
  (1998) 12.20 16.60 7.30      
Egypt (1995) 22.90 23.30 22.50 (1991) 42.60 11.40 - 32.00 
  (2000) 16.70 - - (1995) 42.80 10.80 71.50 32.60 
      (2000) 43.90 11.30 71.70 (1999) 34.40 
Iran - - - - (1994) 7.80 1.70 12.90 43.00 
      (1998) 7.20 1.50 11.60 44.10 
Morocco (1991) 13.10 18.00 7.60 (1991) 7.50 1.30 - 39.20 
  (1999) 19.00 27.20 12.00 (1999) 14.30 3.10 23.50 (1998) 39.50 
Sudan - - - -  0.00 - - - 
Tunisia (1995) 7.60 13.90 3.60 (1995) 12.70 3.10 22.90 41.70 
      (2000) 6.60 1.30 11.90 40.80 
Jordan - - - - (1992) 10.60 2.20 19.20 43.40 
      (1997) 7.40 1.40 12.80 36.40 
Lebanon - - - -  - - - - 
Syria - - - -  - - - - 
Yemen (1998)  45.00 30.80 (1992) 20.70 6.10 35.00 39.50 
          (1998) 45.20 15.00 73.70 33.40 
1/ Defined as the mean shortfall from the US$2/day (counting the non-poor as having zero shortfall), expressed as percentage of the poverty line.  
2/ The working poor are defined as those who work and who belong to poor households (ILO definition). - Data not available. 
Sources: 2004 Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM) , 4th Edition (Table 20: Poverty, working poverty and income distribution) 
International Monetary Fund Country (IMF) Reports 2005-2006 (for employment growth) 
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Table 4 
Selected labour market indicators, 1980-2003  
Selected Middle East and North African countries 
  Total labour force (in '000)  Labour force participation rate (%) Unemployment rate (%) 1/ 
1980 1990 2000 2003 1980 1990 2000 2003 1980 1990 2000 2003  Country 
male female male female male female male female male female male female male female male female male female male female male female male female 
Algeria (1985) (1996)         (1985) (1996)         - - - - 26.6 31.4 23.4 25.4 
 15-24 994 171 2,020 455 - - - - 45.1 8.0 65.0 15.3 - - - -         (2001)     
 25-54 2566 306 4,392 534 - - - - 95.0 10.3 95.2 11.8 - - - -                 
 55-64 285 27 - - - - - - 71.6 5.9 - - - - - -                 
 65 +  102 11 - - - - - - 26.6 2.4 - - - - - -                 
Egypt         (2002)             (2002)     3.9 19.2 5.2 17.9 5.1 22.7 7.3 23.2 
 15-24 2,160 325 2,090 1,150 2,951 1,302 - - 51.1 8.3 40.6 25.0 39.0 19.6 - -                 
 25-54 2,283 309 8,088 2,738 11,119 2,942 - - - - 97.0 31.6 98.3 21.8 - -                 
 55-64 - - 1,145 186 1,464 99 - - - - 77.2 11.4 60.6 4.0 - -                 
 65 +  391 114 482 86 284 15 - - 52.7 14.7 41.5 12.7 16.3 1.4 - -                 
Iran (1982) (1991)         (1982) (1991)         12.9 25.5 8.5 13.4 13.8 16.5 10.1 20.4 
 15-24 1,346 344 3,390 657 - - - - 53.9 14.1 60.8 12.4 - - - - (1986) (1996)     
 25-54 3,500 400 7,548 753 - - - - 95.8 12.0 95.5 9.8 - - - -                 
 55-64 458 17 1,261 49 - - - - 78.2 3.3 83.1 4.0 - - - -                 
 65 +  195 10 634 28 - - - - 53.9 2.4 59.5 3.4 - - - -                 
Morocco (1982)   (2001)     (1982)   (2001)     13.4 18.5 14.2 20.4 13.8 13.0 11.5 13.0 
 15-24 1,362 419 582 296 1,983 655 1,989 748 64.9 19.6 49.6 23.0 63.6 21.2 62.0 23.8 (1987)         17.4 15.9 
 25-54 2,655 513 2,055 645 4,959 1,726 5,250 1,930 93.6 17.0 93.6 29.6 93.8 30.7 93.7 32.3             9.6 11.9 
 55-64 380 58 - - - - - - 78.9 12.8 - - - - - -                 
 65 +  178 20 - - - - - - 41.8 5.3 - - - - - -                 
Sudan (1983) (1996)         (1983) (1996)         - - - - - - - - 
 15-24 1,052 477 1,113 712 - - - - 67.7 29.0 44.6 26.7 - - - -                 
 25-54 2,413 920 3,277 1,321 - - - - 95.6 32.4 93.9 33.1 - - - -                 
 55-64 303 92 466 92 - - - - 93.2 33.5 93.2 21.3 - - - -                 
 65 +  232 62 394 40 - - - - 79.0 25.5 73.0 11.3 - - - -                 
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Tunisia     (1997)       (1997)         - - - - - - - - 
 15-24 454 160 474 250 - - - - 70.1 24.3 50.0 27.3 - - - -                 
 25-54 819 182 1,519 437 - - - - 96.5 19.4 94.9 27.0 - - - -                 
 55-64 123 17 173 26 - - - - 70.8 11.1 66.4 10.0 - - - -                 
 65 +  51 5 90 9 - - - - 32.5 4.1 34.0 3.5 - - - -                 
Jordan     (1991)         (1983) (1991)         4.8 22.8 18.1 30.0 12.3 21.1 14.7 19.7 
 15-24 - - 21 4 - - - - - - 50.0 11.2 46.3 7.8 - - (1982) (1993) 24.5 39.2 28.0 43.2 
 25-54 - - 41 6 - - - - - - 92.4 14.0 85.1 16.9 - -         7.8 11.7 7.8 11.7 
 55-64 - - 5 0 - - - - - - 66.1 2.4 51.5 1.0 43.2 1.3                 
 65 +  - - 1 0 - - - - 33.8 0.9 30.5 0.9 15.2 0.3 13.9 0.4                 
                                                  
Lebanon - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Syria (1981) (1994)         (1981) (1994)         - - 9.0 7.2 - - - - 
 15-24 570 67 913 161 1,178 347 1235 349 65.3 8.1 64.7 11.5 62.5 18.9 60.0 18.8     (1997)         
 25-54 1,042 84 1,853 264 2,361 578 2471 583 95.8 7.8 96.2 13.9 97.8 23.7 96.4 21.3                 
 55-64 133 5 214 13 248 35 210 31 77.7 3.0 77.4 4.8 71.5 12.7 53.8 8.5                 
 65 +  54 1 108 5 171 19 142 11 37.4 1.1 48.4 2.4 55.3 9.9 37.4 4.3                 
Yemen     (1994)             (1994)         - - 12.5 8.2 - - - - 
 15-24 - - 513 164 - - - - - - 39.5 14.0 - - - -     (1999)         
 25-54 - - 1684 370 - - - - - - 91.8 19.2 - - - -                 
 55-64 - - 210 33 - - - - - - 80.9 14.1 - - - -                 
 65 +  - - 136 16 - - - - - - 49.7 6.6 - - - -                 
1/ Breakdown of unemployment is available for 15-24 (youth unemployment) and adult unemployment (15 +) only. The line corresponding to 25-54 age bracket refers to 15 +. 
- Data not available 
Source: 2004 Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM) , 4th Edition (Table 1c: Labour force participation rate. Table 8a: Uenmployment and Table 9: Youth unemployment) 
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Table 5 
Total labour force, status in employment and real manufacturing wages, 1980-2003 
Selected Middle East and North African countries 
Percent share of total employment (%) 1/ 
Country (Period) 
Total labour 
force 15+ 
(in '000) 
(Period) 
Total 
employmen 
(in '000) 
Wage and 
salaried 
workers 
Self-employed 
workers 
Contributing 
family 
workers 
Period 
Real manufacturing 
wage index 
(1995=100) 
Algeria (1982) 4,164 - - - - - (1992) 126.40 
  (1996) 7,903 - - - - - (1996) 97.90 
Egypt (1980) 10,340 - - - - - (1982) 166.70 
  (1990) 15,964 - - - - - (1990) 114.90 
  (2001) 19,253 (2000) 17,203 59.90 28.50 11.50 (2002) 118.50 
Iran (1982) 6,271 - - - - - (1994) 113.00 
  (1986) 12,338 - - - - - (1999) 110.70 
  (1996) 15,651 (1996) 14,572 51.7 39.7 5.5 (2001) 128.00 
Morocco (1982) 5,585 - - - - - - - 
  (1990) 3,804 - - - - -   
  (2001) 10,230 - - - - -   
  (2003) 10,902 (2003) 9,603 38.10 31.10 29.70   
Sudan (1983) 5,549 - - - - - - - 
  (1996) 7,415 - - - - -   
Tunisia (1980) 1,810 (1989) 1,979 67.00 23.40 8.90 - - 
  (1997) 2,978 (1999) 2,635 68.40 23.30 7.80   
    (2000) 2,705 68.10 23.60 7.40   
    (2003) 2,951 64.30 26.80 8.70   
Jordan (1991) 79 - - - - - (1994) 94.40 
         (2000) 93.60 
         (2001) 90.00 
Lebanon (1997) 1,347 - - - - - - - 
Syria (1981) 1,955 - - - - - - - 
  (1994) 3,530 - - - - -   
  (2000) 4,937 - - - - -   
  (2003) 5,032 - - - - -   
Yemen (1994) 3,126 (1999) 3,622 41.60 58.00 0.30 - - 
1/ Figures will not add up to 100%. Not classified items (average of 1% of total employment) are not included in the table. 
- Data not available.  
Source: 2004 Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM) , 4th Edition (Table 1c: Labour force participation and Table 15: Manufacturing wage indices) 
 33
Table 6 
Total labour force and employment by sector, 1980-2003 
Selected Middle East and North African Countries 
    Total 
 labour force  
Total 
employment 
Percent share of total employment 
(%) 
Country (Period) (in '000) 
(Period
) (in '000) Agriculture Industry Services 
Algeria (1982) 4,164 (1997) 5,708 15.5 20.5 64.0 
  (1996) 7,903 (2000) 5,726 15.7 24.3 59.0 
    (2001) 6,229 21.1 24.3 54.7 
Egypt (1980) 10,340 (1980) 9,799 42.4 20.1 35.7 
  (1990) 15,964 (1990) 14,361 39.0 20.7 40.1 
  (2001) 19,253 (2000) 17,203 29.6 21.3 49.1 
    (2002) 17,856 27.5 20.6 51.9 
Iran (1982) 6,271 (1990) 12,108 26.4 28.3 45.3 
  (1986) 12,338 (1991) 12,534 25.6 28.9 45.6 
  (1996) 15,651 (1992) 12,986 24.7 29.4 45.9 
    (1993) 13,471 23.8 30.1 46.1 
    (1994) 13,986 23.0 30.7 46.3 
    (1995) 14,542 22.1 31.4 46.5 
    (1996) 14,572 23.0 30.7 44.3 
Morocc
o 
(1982) 5,585 - - - - - 
  (1990) 3,804 - - - - - 
  (2001) 10,230 - - - - - 
  (2003) 10,902 (2003) 9,603 43.9 20.2 35.9 
Sudan (1983) 5,549 - - - - - 
  (1996) 7,415      
Tunisia (1980) 1,810 - - - - - 
  (1997) 2,978      
Jordan (1991) 79 - - - - - 
Lebano
n 
(1997) 1,347 - - - - - 
Syria (1981) 1,955 - - - - - 
  (1994) 3,530 - - - - - 
  (2000) 4,937 - - - - - 
  (2003) 5,032 (2002) 4,822 30.3 26.9 42.8 
Yemen (1994) 3,126 (1999) 3,622 54.1 11.1 34.7 
1/ Figures will not add up to 100%. Not classified items (average of 1% of total employment) are not included in the 
presentation. 
- Data not available. 
Source: 2004 Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM) , 4th Edition (Table 1c: Labour force participation and 
Table 4a: Employment by sector) 
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Table 7 
Real GDP growth, sectoral employment growth, employment elasticity and poverty, 1980-2003 
Selected Middle East and North African countries 
Sectoral value-added GDP growth and employment elasticity (1991-2003) International poverty line (%) 2/   /  Employment growth (%)  
Agriculture Industry Services Total GDP (population below US$2/day) Country 
1990 2000 2003 Growth Elasticity Growth Elasticity Growth Elasticity Growth (Period)     
                            
Algeria 26.10 2.70 5.10 3.70 1.22 2.30 0.75 3.20 0.51 2.60 (1995) 15.10   
Egypt - 2.38 1.68 3.10 0.27 3.80 0.14 4.60 0.81 4.40 (1991) 42.60   
                      (1995) 42.80   
                      (2000) 43.90   
  a/                         
Iran 10.05 6.06 4.03 4.70 1.50 0.30 0.30 7.30 0.20 4.10 (1994) 7.80   
                      (1998) 7.20   
Morocco - 0.30 4.60 0.30 0.63 3.20 0.52 2.90 1.06 2.50 (1991) 7.50   
                      (1999) 14.30   
Sudan - - - 9.30 0.53 5.70 0.37 3.30 0.10 5.60 - -   
Tunisia - - - 2.20 2.05 4.60 0.77 5.30 0.57 4.60 (1995) 12.70   
                      (2000) 6.60   
Jordan - - - 0.60 1.61 6.00 1.27 4.60 1.28 5.10 (1992) 10.60   
                      (1997) 7.40   
Lebanon - - - - - - - - - - - -   
Syria - - - 4.20 1.89 7.30 0.63 3.40 1.50 4.40 - -   
Yemen - - - 6.30 1.14 5.30 0.72 5.60 0.77 5.60 (1992) 20.70   
                      (1998) 45.20   
1/ Data in the 1980s are not available. 
2/ Data in the 1980s and 2003 are not available.   
a/ Due to limited data, the 1990 figure refers to fiscal year 1986/1987 and 1999/2000 growth. Iranian fiscal year ends on 20 March.    
 International Monetary Fund Country (IMF) Reports 2005-2006 (for employment growth)   
World Bank World Development Indicators 2006 
 
